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A growing number of recent studies on the Egyptian revolution attribute its beginning to a set of 
socio-economic and political factors. On the political side, explanations includes a) the persistent 
rule by terror for thirty years through the emergency law, b) the prohibition on political rights 
and civil freedoms and lack of free and fair elections, c) police brutality against activists– namely 
the case of Khaled Said) the wide spread corruption, e) the spread of virtual-opposition through 
social networking websites and the Arabic satellite, f) the success of the Tunisian revolution as a 
bloodless and fast change, the sacrifice of Mohammed Bouazizi, and finally the spread of 
wikileaks scandals that threw more mud over the regime‟s face. . On the socio-economic side, 
the revolution is largely attributed to the rise of unemployment, inflation of food prices, low 
income and rising inequality, the lack of health services. In short, the revolution is explained by 
the increasing density and pervasiveness of social, economic and political grievances that 
culminated into an uncontrollable anger towards a diminishing legitimacy of Mubarak‟s thirty-
years-rule of the country. This was largely reflected in the main demands of the protestors to end 
Hosni Mubarak‟s rule, end emergency law, freedom, social justice and human dignity. 
 
This paper suggests a growing significance of the economic motives of social and political 
change through highlighting the economic dimensions of Egypt before 25
th
 January 2011. It 
reviews different indicators of the economic conditions in Egypt before the revolution, in a way 
to answer a main question, “what are the economic motives behind the 25
th
 January revolution in 
Egypt?” The structural approach followed on this paper slightly touches on the Marxian 
conception of dependency– by which social, political and cultural structures are perceived as 
dependent on the economic super-structure. In this paper, these dimensions are seen as rather 
intertwined and mutually dependent on each other; the economic motives are only one face of a 
complex web of explanations that generate meaning and resonance to similar experiences 
elsewhere. Meanwhile, the structural approach is deemed suitable to a leaderless revolution, 
since it provides a set of „totalising‟ factors that facilitate collective action on massive scales by 
creating a national narrative of the revolution. 
 
This paper is organized around eight sections that circumscribe the economic situation in Egypt; 
economic stagnation, income inequality and poverty levels, the demographic aspect–population 
size, unemployment, rise of food prices compared to income levels, education‟s irrelevance to 
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Revolutions in Theory and Practice 
 
 
Joseph D. Reid, a professor of economics with specialisation in economic history and 
developmental economics underlined how specific economic interests contribute in motivating 
the masses towards revolutions. “In fact, diverse economic factors brought about the American 
revolution above which was taxation. The disputes over trade, government control, and taxes 
eventually brought about the American revolution and shaped the way America is today” (Reid, 
1978). 
 
In an economic interpretation of the French Revolution, Florin Aftalion emphasized that 
economic theory can provide a satisfactory explanation to the occurrence of the French 
revolution. Directly before the French Revolution, France was in a major economic crisis. There 
was a royal debt; the French government kept spending more money than it was receiving by 
taxes. “At this time there was immense poverty in France, even though some people in France 
were wealthy. Taxes were high and so were prices, but the wages were low. Unable to provide 
for their families the lower classes of France lived an economical crisis which drove them to 
revolt. Economic factors included hunger and malnutrition in the most destitute segments of the 
population, harsh economic situations they faced, especially bread shortages” (Aftalion, 1989).  
 
James Davies also noted that revolutions are most likely to occur “when a prolonged period of 
objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal”, 
(Davies, 1962).  
 
Additionally, a number of surveys recently conducted on the Arab region suggest a higher 
weight for socio-economic causes of a nation-wide revolution in the Arab countries, compared to 
narrow-based protests that usually erupt on political and sectarian concerns. A survey by Jamal 
and Tessler (2008) reports a sweeping support for democracy in the Arab world sizes up to 86% 
- 91% of the total respondents to their survey in five Arab countries. The survey concluded that 
democracy for the Arab middle class men and women is an instrumental concept, relating 
directly to social and economic concerns, poverty, unemployment, housing, etc., rather than 
political freedom and civil rights (Ibid, 109).  
 
Meanwhile, growing eyewitness evidence supports the point that the revolution effectively 
started on the 28
th
 January when the poor youth, mostly living in slums and urban backyards, had 
urged their social groups to support what was, then, activist-led protests raising demands for 
political freedoms. The police brutality against middle and high-class activists, who vastly 
organized themselves through social media, draw the sympathy and support of thousands of slum 
inhabitants who once decided to voice their, mainly, economic grievances. 
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The Economic Causes of the Egyptian Revolution 
 
 
Poverty Levels and Inequality of Income Distribution  
 
As income disparity increased in the past 25 years in most parts of the world, this issue is taking 
place at the top of the public agenda nowadays. In most countries of the world, inequality is 
considered as a lead cause for revolutions and unrest. 
 
When Karl Marx predicted that an economic revolution would occur, one of his main concerns 
was related to the unequal distribution of wealth. According to Marx, wealth and power would 
naturally tend to concentrate in the hands of the few in the upper class who in turn exploited the 
lower class. This eventually leads to certain problems, foremost among them poverty and income 
equality. 
 
Between the 1980s and mid-2000s, income inequality rose significantly in countries as diverse as 
China, India, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. According to the OECD, during the same 
time frame, the Gini coefficient increased in 16 out of 20 rich countries. The situation was no 
different in the emerging market economies; it rose in India, China, Indonesia, South Africa, and 
all the post-Communist countries. In much of the world, the size of the economic pie has been 
shrinking, and accordingly the poor‟s slice has been getting smaller.  
 
Another common method of analyzing economic distribution is to use the family as the basic 
income unit and then rank all families from lowest to highest. After the incomes are ranked, they 
are then divided into fifths, and then examined. This data is then plotted on the Lorenz curve- a 
curve that shows how much the actual distribution of income varies from an equal distribution- 
by adding the percentage the lowest fifth earned to that of the next highest fifth, and then plotted 
as the first point of the graph. This number is then added to the middle fifth and plotted as the 
second point. This process continues until the cumulative values of all fifths are plotted. If all 
families earned the same income then the graph for the Lorenz curve would be a diagonal line 
beginning in the lower left-hand corner and moving towards the upper right hand corner. But 
because all families do not receive the same income, the curve showing the actual income 
distribution is curved.  
 
Living standards in Egypt are low by international standards, and have declined consistently 
since 1990. According to United Nations figures, 20 to 30 percent of the population lives below 
the poverty line. Uneven development and unfair income distribution has led to the emergence of 
an affluent class that controls most of the country's wealth Living in such Cairo suburbs as 
Garden City, Al-Zamalek and Nasr City, the wealthy enjoy an elevated standard of living. Yet 
not far from these affluent neighborhoods, a significant number of poor Egyptians live in 
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squalor, with poor and overcrowded housing, limited food supply, and inadequate access to clean 
water, good quality health care, or education.  
 
On the Gini coefficient scale, Egypt is ranked as the 92nd most unequal country with a Gini 
Coefficient of around 34.4 and this contributed dramatically to widespread protests and 
government overhaul.  
 
Inequality in the distribution of wealth is further dictated by geographical regions in Egypt. The 
north of Egypt has always received more government attention than the rural south. The central 
government, which retains great power over the country, has always been based in the north, and 
has therefore based major economic activity in that area. According to the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (EIU) Country Profile for 2000-01, almost one-half of economic and social 
establishments of Egypt are based in the north in Cairo and Alexandria. This uneven distribution 
resulted in rural-urban migration from south to north. Such migration contributed in worsening 
the state of underdevelopment prevailing in the south.  
 
The economic reforms launched by the Egyptian government in the early 1990s have been 
double-edged, severely affecting the lower classes. Both the rural and urban poor have suffered 
from the long decline in the quality of social services provided.  
 
Income distribution has been unequal in Egypt since Sadat's open-door policy. Even before 
Sadat's open-door policy, in spite of Egypt's 1952 Land Reform Law (later amended to put an 
upper limit of no more than 50 feddans on land ownership), and in spite of Nasser's socialism, 
taxation, and rent controls, still income distribution was unequal. The following table provides 
cross-country comparisons of income distribution which might serve a purpose to compare 
figures for income distribution in Egypt prior to its open-door policy in 1974 with those in other 
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In analyzing the data, it can be observed that the households in the upper 20 percent of income 
brackets had almost half of Egypt's national income, while in other capitalistic nations their share 
was approximately 40 percent. The richest 10 percent of Egypt's households had one third of the 
country's income, in comparison to less than one quarter in the case of England, France, and even 
the United States. 
 
A report recently published by the Egyptian government itself admits that in the last few years 
poverty and inequality have grown in the country. That is the reason why, in spite of the ban on 
protests, there have been for some years constant workers‟ strikes and demonstrations on the 
streets and factories, demanding decent wages and greater distribution of wealth. Therefore, it 
can be observed that Egypt‟s imbalanced income distribution has reached a level that created 
social tensions and led to serious crisis manifested in the January 25
th
 revolution.  
 
According to official World Bank statistics, Egyptian GDP and GNI have been following an 



















As for the GINI index for inequality, the statistics indicate an almost unchanging state of the 





                                                     
1 The data is derived for the World Bank statistics on: 
 
   Chart derived from (korotayev and Zikina, 2011) 
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The share of the highest 20% of the national income amounted to 41% in 2005, while the share 
of the lowest 20% of the population was only 9.0% along the period from 1990-2005. Poverty 
headcount ratio at the national poverty line in percentage sized up to 22% in 2008 compared to 
19.4% in 1996. 
While these indicators suggest a relatively stable and forwarding economic development in the 
country, a number of critiques are addressed at the credibility of information sources on which 
the World Bank data is based (reference). Meanwhile, a parallel measure of human development 
indexes suggests a different view on the poverty of youth– its causes and consequences. The 
Human Development Report of Egypt in 2010 examined the case of young poor in rural and 
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urban Egypt, highlighting the role of social stratification in discriminating against the poor 
youth. Among the results it reports is a shocking percentage, 44%, of youth in rural upper Egypt 
defined as poor compared to 22.7%,19.3 %, 8.8%, in upper urban, lower rural and lower urban 
regions respectively (2010, 76).  
There are important areas at which poor youth are especially excluded: overcrowded living 
arrangements and ownership of various assets–cellular phones and computers. The deprivation 
indicators among youth in Egypt suggest a higher propensity to experience poverty at lower age 
groups and the „younger young‟ compared to „older young‟ (ibid): “Poverty rates peak 
dramatically for teenagers between 15 to 17 years, rising to almost 29% and almost 27% for 
young adults between 18 and 20 years.” (77). the pervasiveness of poverty in different youth 
segments is also striking.  
According to the UNICEF report on child poverty in Egypt (2010), around half of the children 
(47%) in poor household experience at least one severe aspect of deprivation among six other 
dimensions (health, education, shelter, nutrition, water, sanitation and information) as compared 
to 14% of non-poor children (ibid, 78). In such a way, it is not surprising that most of the active 
figures since 25
th
 January protests are among the youth. The significance and impact of youth 
activist is further highlighted through Bayat‟s approach to social-non-movement, which focuses 
on the spatial characteristics of poverty and social inequality in urban Cairo, and how a „politics 
of practice‟ by youth poor/disadvantaged living at the backyards of urban Cairo, has accumulated 
social and economic grievances that suddenly erupted in the 28
th
 of January. The next paragraph 
gives a closer look into Bayat‟s amazingly relevant insights on the silent, fluid, flexible and self-
producing strategy of dissent adopted by the urban poor” (p.16). 
According to Bayat, the poor slums around urban districts in Cairo represent the hard bulk of 
masses in lower urban Egypt, in which the poor silently encroach into the public spaces of urban 
Egypt. Examples of such „encroachment‟ include the use of public spaces for private gains (paid 
parking, street sidewalks are used by venders who expand their business from benefiting from 
popular trademarks like Adidas. In such ways, „the 'right to city' of rural youth migrants 
transforms the social configuration, invade the urban modern way of life and impose different 
social and cultural presence. 
The passive networking among such masses, termed as „non-movement‟ turn into active 
networking when faced with a common threat or opportunities (2009, 13-6). By this insight, we 
understand how the slum dwellers, the migrant rural poor in urban Egypt, became suddenly an 
compelling, irresistible, wide-spread and hardly controllable force of change, when inspired by a 
partial breakthrough, opportunity, in the regime after the protests of urban middle and high-class 
activists in the 25
th
 January.  
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In conclusion, while the economic indicators show a relatively stable and even improving status 
of economic development in Egypt, the spatial and demographic factors, along with other 
equally effective political and social aspects has sized up into a massive nation-wide revolution 
that voiced out primarily socio-economic grievances of the population: bread, freedom, and 
social justice and human dignity. 
 
 
Overpopulation and Youth Unemployment 
 
In the search for underlying causes of the Egyptian revolution is the demographics; an explosive 
mix of high population growth leading to a "youth bulge”
3
, where one in five Egyptians is 
between ages 15 and 24, and one - half of the population is below age 25 (figure 3). Combined 
with urbanisation, jobless growth partly linked to structural adjustment, and the rapid expansion 
of university education has produced what is called "a new sociological type: the graduate with 









Figure (3) Youth Bulge in Egypt, Population Council Youth Survey 2009 
 
The Ex- President Husni Mubarak ruled Egypt for nearly thirty years, during which the 
population grew by 90%, from 45 million to 85 million, according to United Nations (UN) 
estimates, despite concerted government campaigns to slow down population growth. The vast 
majority of Egyptians live in the limited spaces near the banks of the Nile River, in an area of  
 
                                                     
3 Wikipedia, Egypt Population Pyramid 2005.svg 
4 Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2008 
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about 40,000 square kilometers (15,000 sq mi), where the only arable land is found and 
competing with the need of human habitations.  
In late 2010, around 40% of Egypt's population of just fewer than 80 million lived on the fiscal 
income equivalent of roughly US$2 per day with a large part of the population relying on 
subsidised goods.  
Moreover, according to the Population Reference Bureau‟s annual report in 2010
5
 two-thirds of 
Egyptians are under 30, and each year 700,000 new graduates chase 200,000 new jobs. With the 
number of new people entering the job force at about 4% a year, unemployment in Egypt is 
almost 10 times as high for college graduates as it is for people who have gone through 
elementary school, particularly educated urban youth, who are precisely those people that were 
seen out in the streets during the January 25 revolution. Egypt‟s youth are the faces behind this 
leaderless revolution; the revolt, in large part, was spurred by their finesse in using social media 
and networking to organise and make their voices heard. 
 
Millions of young people throughout the country have been too frustrated for too long with the 
constraints of the government of the Ex-regime and the lack of future job prospects. The sense of 
hopelessness, stemming from over education and limited employment opportunities has reached 
a breaking point. With a corrupted government that neglected to invest in the younger 
generation, possibilities for the future seemed very sad. Therefore, the large population of 
unemployed youth was forced to work informal low paying jobs, create employment for 
themselves, or wait until the recession ends and their elders retire.  Young people thus either end 
up living at home or heading back to school, with free time to grow increasingly depressed and 
frustrated.  
 
The Population Reference Bureau (PRB) has also referred to the fact that 90% of the 
unemployed in Egypt are youth, pointing out that the situation is particularly tough for young 
women looking for a job. 
 
Additionally, in the Population Council‟s 2009 survey
6 
conducted among youth in Egypt, 30% of 
males ages 15 to 29 reported that they were looking to migrate, mostly to an oil-rich Gulf state 
and largely because they did not expect to find work at their home country. 70% of unemployed 
youth said that they were jobless because there was simply no work available. Furthermore, more 
than 40% thought personal connections were more important than personal skills in securing a 
job, which was at the time of the survey or before the revolution, one reflection of the society-
wide corruption that ignited the protests.
 
 
                                                     
5 Population Reference Bureau Annual Report, 2010 
6 Population Council Youth Survey, 2009 
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Furthermore, Studies of the school-to-work transition in Egypt show that young people face 
serious challenges in finding employment, not only because of the scarcity of jobs relative to the 
numbers of new students in the job market, but also because of their lack of appropriate 
education. On the other hand, enrollment in secondary and higher education has reached 
unprecedented levels for both boys and girls but without being translated into higher 
employment rates and wages for young people. According to the 2009 survey, less than 50% of 
the higher education students who have participated in the youth survey believed that their 
education prepared them for the labor market. 
 
 
A recent report by the Egyptian Council of Ministries
7
 shows that the number of Egyptians living 
below the poverty line has risen from 17% in the year 2000 to 22% in the year 2010, with people 
living in the rural areas making up about 80% of the poor. As mentioned earlier, more than one-
half of the population still lives in rural areas and accounts for majority of the country‟s illiterate 
population, estimated to be in millions. This educational deficit is also marked by a pronounced 
gender gap; where two-thirds of illiterate youth are female. 
In short, several factors have played a part or more in bringing Egyptians out on the streets on 
January 25, projecting and broadcasting their upheaval and passions on to the screen for the first 
time since long time ago. The twitterati saw a social media revolution, the foodies saw a food 
price hikes at its core, others saw a hunger for democratization and human rights and other 
groups saw a backlash against routine torture and abuse. Amongst a full range of different 
drivers of change were overpopulation and youth unemployment relative to the weak economy. 
Reports have shown that two-thirds of Egyptians are below 30 years old, and each year 700,000 
new graduates chase 200,000 new jobs, referring to the fact that 90% of the unemployed in 
Egypt are youth.  The educated unemployed youth simply represent the people that were seen out 
in the streets during the January 25 revolution. 
 
Education and Market Matching  
 
Education and seeking job opportunities in Egypt have been a burden on the Egyptian citizens in 
general. This goes back to several factors, among which are: irrelevance of education to the 
requirements of the job market; higher supply than demand in the market; saturated public sector 
that is no longer perceived as a window of opportunity for employment; high demands of the 
private sector for employment, leaving behind many who are ineligible to apply, among other.  
 
                                                     
7 Egyptian Council of Ministries Report, 2010 
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Hence, finding a job has become really hard over the past year. Also, with the present culture of 
nepotism, even those who are eligible might not get an equal opportunity to compete based on 
fair competition. This is embedded in the culture that many get hired in positions, only because 
of their social networks, relationships, and/or shared interests. This has also affected the choice 
of investment in education of some people and whether it is really worth saving up for obtaining 
degrees or not. The overall education level thus decreased in (2005/6) from 76.4% to 66% in the 
year 2007/8. Prior to the revolution, it has been recognized that the quality of education in 
relation to market demand continues to be a problem. According to the Egypt Human 
Development Report (EDHR) of 2010
8
, 62.4% of the unemployed persons in 2007 were holders 
of intermediate qualifications. This strongly supports the fact that the quality of education does 
not match the market requirements, leaving the young unemployed when inflation was also on 
the rise.  
 
Another factor is the lack of investment in vocational training, leaving small income generating 
industries ignored. As a result, most of the young people in Egypt who seek university degrees in 
the hope of finding a reasonable job opportunity end up being unemployed, causing frustration 
and affecting time use as the Survey of Young People 2009 suggest.  
 
Although Egypt was also one of the least countries affected by the global financial crisis of 2009, 
its impact on the internal job markets and on prices was negative. Any economic problem such 
as unemployment was attributed to the crisis, in addition to the increased price of goods.  
 
Wealth and Gender Gaps 
One of the main demands of the revolution is social justice. There is an existent gap between the 
rich and the poor, which has raised debate over years about distribution of wealth in the country.  
About 20% of Egyptians live below the poverty line. For three decades, Egyptians have suffered 
from economic policies that do not have a direct tangible impact on the average citizen.   
 
According to the Egypt Human Development Report (EDHR), the percentage of the poor 
increased from the year 2008 (19.6%) to 2010 (21.6%), besides the increase in the number of the 
absolute poor. Development practitioners had predicted that a revolution will happen, mainly 
because basic needs were no longer available as before. There was a problem in bread supply, a 
basic necessity in Egypt, and people had to wait in long lines to get this good.  
 
Programs were designed by the government back then to address poverty in the poorest areas. 
One of the programs was the Poorest or the neediest 1000 villages, which was mainly used as 
propaganda for the son of the former president Mubarak. The government has further worked on 
a poverty map, based upon which public programs addressing poverty were implemented. The 
                                                     
8 Egypt Human Development Report (EDHR), 2010 
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poverty map identified geographic regions and groups that were in more need as well as 
households that suffered the most from poverty in Egypt. According to the national income and 
expenditure survey of 2008/9 the upward trend in the poverty rate was on the rise again as a 
direct result of the global financial crisis. This has a direct impact on the rates of investment, 
accordingly employment and economic growth, affecting the level of poverty overall. This 
suggests that overall poverty rates are linked to economic performance, which was not in its best 
condition for the three years preceding this crisis.  
 
Besides, still persist large regional disparities between the developed areas and the Upper Rural 
Egypt where the population is the most deprived (43.7% of its residents are income poor). 
According to Survey of Young People in Egypt 2010
9
, whereas rural youth account for 59% of 
Egypt‟s total youth, they account for 85% of Egypt‟s poor youth. What is obvious, therefore, is 
that being poor is very much a characteristic of residing in rural Egypt and thus having less 
access to public goods and services. There is a Two-way interaction between poverty and its 
attributes- Lack of education and skills, and absence of decent jobs maintains poverty.   
 
Egypt is rated number 120 among 128 countries on gender gap measurement.  Full and 
productive employment and decent work for all remains a challenge, particularly for women and 
young people. The labor market remains highly gender discriminated. Women participation in 
the labor market is among the lowest in the world, where young women (aged 18-29) represent 
18.5% of the Egyptian workforce compared to more than 50% of men. Egypt‟s unemployment 
reaches almost 23% among women and young males aged 15-24, and exceeds 60% among 
young females in the same age group, compared to the overall unemployment rate of 
approximately 9.4% in 2009. Almost 75% of jobs created between 1998 and 2006 were in the 
informal sector.  The informal sector currently represents the main source of employment for 
new labor market entrants. Women‟s engagement in the informal sector differs from men‟s one.  
 
Whereas most men in the informal sector are either wage workers or employers, Women are 
primarily non-wage workers contributing in various ways to household production and family 
businesses. Most Women in the informal sector work in agriculture or horticulture agro-business, 
with agriculture continuing to account for one third of all female employment. This sector, by 
nature, is an insecure sector, since it does not offer a work contract or social or medical 
insurance. 
 
In addition, while women make important contributions to the rural economy, their productivity 
is limited due to lack of access to land, credit, networks, marketing and information, as well as 
their heavy workload due to household responsibilities. 1.1 million Women work in the informal 
sector, 93% of these in rural areas. In 2006, according to United Nations report entitled Arab 
Youth Strategizing for the Millennium Development Goals, in Egypt, 41% of adult females were 
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illiterate, and mostly in the rural areas of Upper Egypt. Moreover, 54% of rural Upper Egyptian 




To summarize, education irrelevance to market demands as well as the wealth and gender gaps 
were of a high relevance to the outbreak of the revolution of the 25
th
 of January. The lack of 
investment in vocational education and training has derived people to seek higher educational 
certificates, such as university education, leading to more supply in the job market, noting that 
official development reports that highlight the fact that education does not match market needs. 
The wealth gap and the disappearance of the middle class in society along with the existing 
gender gap and the absence of social justice, all helped in a way or another in triggering the 




More factors are attributed to socio-economic and political factors. Explanations include: the rise 
of unemployment, the persistent rule by terror for thirty years through the emergency law, the 
prohibition on political rights and civil freedoms and lack of free and fair elections, police 
brutality against activists, the wide spread corruption, low income and rising inequality, the 
spread of virtual-opposition through social networking websites and the Arabic satellite, the 
success of the Tunisian revolution., inflation of food prices, the lack of health services. In short, 
the revolution is explained by the increasing density and pervasiveness of social, economic and 
political grievances that culminated into an uncontrollable anger towards a diminishing 
legitimacy of Mubarak‟s thirty-years-rule of the country. This was largely reflected in the main 
















                                                     
10 Labor Force Sample Survey, 2008 





Joseph D. Reid (1978): “Economic Burden: Spark to the American Revolution?” The Journal of 
Economic History Vol. 38, No. 1; The Tasks of Economic History. 
 
Aftalion, F. Florin (1989), “The French Revolution: An Economic Interpretation”, Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Davies, James (1962): “Toward a Theory of Revolution”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 
27, No. 1. 
 
UN Development Programme and The Institute of National Planning (Egypt), Egypt Human 
Development Report 2010 (Cairo: UN Development Programme and the Institute of National 
Planning, 2010), accessible on:  
 
Population Council: “Survey of Young People in Egypt”, (Cairo: Population Council, December 
2010), accessible on: http://www.prb.org/Publications/Datasheets/2010/2010wpds.aspx  
 
Council of Ministries: “16.3 Million Egyptians live Under the Poverty Line”, Al Masry Al Youm 
Newspaper, December, 2010. 
 
Asaad, Ragui (2007): “Unemployment and Youth Insertion in the Labor Market”, Egyptian 
Center for Economic Studies (ECES) Working Paper 118. 
 
Population Reference Bureau (2007): “Challenges and Opportunities – The Population of the 
Middle East and North Africa.” 
 
Population Reference Bureau (2008): “PRB Discuss online: The Middle East Youth Bulge, 
Causes and Consequences.” 
 
Population Reference Bureau (2011): “Youth Revolt in Egypt, a Country at the Turning Point”, 
November 2011.  
Jamal, Amaney and Tessler, Mark (2008): “The Democracy Barometers: Attitudes in the Arab 
World”, Journal of Democracy. http://www.arabbarometer.org/reports/democbarometers.pdf 
Bayat, Asef (2009): “Life As Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East”, Stanford 
University Press. 
17 | P a g e  
 
Green, Duncan (2011): “What Caused the Revolution in Egypt”, The Guardian, posted on 
February, 17
th
 2011, 14.18, accessible on: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/globaldevelopment/poverty-matters/2011/feb/17/what-caused-
egyptian-revolution 
Wahba, Khaled (2011): “The Egyptian Revolution 2011: The Fall of the Virtual Wall - The 
Revolution Systems Thinking Archetype”, 29th International System Dynamics Conference, 
Washington, DC, USA, July 24-28, 2011, accessible on: 
http://www.systemdynamics.org/conferences/2011/proceed/papers/P1436.pdf 
 
World Data Bank (2011): Keyword: Egypt, accessible on: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=2&id=4&hActiveDimensionId=WDI_Series 
Korotayev, Andrey and Zinkina, Julia (2011): “Egyptian Revolution: A demographic Structural 
Analysis”, Primavera, pp: 139-69. Accessible on: 
http://cliodynamics.ru/download/Korotayev_Zinkina_Egyptian_Revolution_Entelequia_New.pdf 
 
 
 
